

etymologisches Wörterbuch der Germanismen im BK(M)S mit brauchbaren Angaben zu Herkunft, Belegalter und aktueller stilistischer wie dialektaler Beleglage bleibt weiterhin ein Desiderat. Die hier angezeigte, in jeglicher Hinsicht Fehler und Unzulänglichkeiten aufweisende Dissertation stellt dazu sicher keine brauchbare Vorarbeit dar.

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GABRIELLA SCHUBERT, HOLM SUNDHAUSSEN (Hrsg.): *Prowestliche und antiwestliche Diskurse in den Balkanländern/Südosteuropa*. 43. Internationale Hochschulwoche der Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft in Tutzing 4.–8.10.2004 (= Südosteuropa-Jahrbuch, Vol. 34). Otto Sagner: München 2008. 312 S. ISBN 978-3-86688-022-1.

The perception of the West in the Balkans is a vast theme, stretching from the Great Schism in 1054 and the capture of Constantinople by the Crusaders in 1204 to the negative attitude of most Balkan peoples – in spite of their governments' reluctant consent – towards the NATO military intervention in Yugoslavia in 1999 and the growing scepticism about the benefits of EU integration. It would be impossible to deal with all aspects in one single volume. The contributors to *Prowestliche und antiwestliche Diskurse in den Balkanländern/Südosteuropa* nevertheless succeeded in bringing to the attention a large variety of them and certainly the most important.

The articles in the volume are organized in alphabetical order by the name of the author. We will review them here thematically. The contributions of Gabriella SCHUBERT, Holm SUNDHAUSSEN and Klaus ROTH obviously have an introductory character. After exploring the geographic and mental borders of Europe and introducing the concepts of Orientalism and Balkanism, SCHUBERT goes deeper into the Western perception of the Balkans and the Balkan perception of the West. She points out that

ever since the late 18th century, Europe has been regarded by the Balkan nations as both an example and a threat: it showed the way to modernity at the possible cost of cultural identity. Schubert refers to the complex Bulgarian literary hero baj Ganjo. In the first part of his novel *Baj Ganjo*, Aleko Konstantinov depicts him as the embodiment of Balkan backwardness; in the second part, he criticizes through baj Ganjo some perfidious political practices, obviously adopted from the West in independent Bulgaria. In spite of all criticism and ridiculing, however, baj Ganjo is cherished by the author and the readership; to the Bulgarians he remains “one of us”. Schubert also draws the attention to the post-World War I phenomenon of “Balkan barbarianism” – the idea, promoted by a number of Yugoslav avant-garde artists, that the Balkan nations have the mission to revitalize anaemic and demoralized Western Europe. According to Schubert, Balkan attitudes towards the West have always been marked by ambiguity: qualities which are praised – efficiency, individual freedom, rationalism, frugality, discipline – may also be disavowed as a lack of solidarity, spontaneity and emotionality. Although such judgments have more to do with the opposition between the values of a rural patriarchal and collectivist society and those of an urban, industrialized and capitalist society, Schubert is right pointing out that several aspects of social life in the Balkans have the cultural potential to enrich Western societies.

SUNDHAUSSEN problematizes the concepts of East and West, identity, culture *et cetera*, challenging the relationship between “space” and “culture” and reminding us of the useful distinction between Europe as an entity with its specific cultural, moral and political traditions, and Europe as a project, a political formation based on cultural, moral and political values and norms agreed upon by the EU member states, and which often still remain to be realized. According to Sundhaussen, Southeast Europe has not played a significant role in the history of Europe as a historical entity and he seems to doubt to what extent the Balkans is prepared to sincerely support Europe as a project. He recommends the use of the term anti-Occidentalism instead of Occidentalism to avoid misunderstanding, since most Occidentalism amounts to an anti-Western mood. Most authors in the volume follow his advice. So will do I in this review, although I am afraid that, reducing Occidentalism to mere negative attitudes towards the West, one risks to veil the complex nature of the phenomenon. I have in mind the continuous oscillation between negative and positive perceptions people in the Balkan have about the West and about themselves. (Neither Orientalism, nor Balkanism can be reduced to a mere negative bias.) Sundhaussen also distinguishes “classical” and “modern anti-Occidentalism”. While “classical anti-Occidentalism” was related mainly to religious issues and was directed against Catholic Western Europe, modern anti-Occidentalism condemns capitalism and imperialism and currently most frequently takes the shape of anti-Americanism. As Margalit and Buruma have shown, there has always existed a Western anti-Occidentalism too – an extreme, often referred to example of which is Nazism. Not accidentally, fascism was quite popular among Balkan intellectuals, albeit rather as a “philosophy” than as a political system. Many other contributors as well argue that Balkan “modern anti-Occidentalism” greatly fits in with Western anti-Occidentalism. While the anti-Western attitudes, adopted from the Russian Slavophiles not only by the Slavs in the Balkans, still contain many “classical” (religious) features, the anti-Occidentalism of

19th-century Balkan radical socialists is fully “modern” and hardly distinguishable from Western (self-)criticism.

Klaus ROTH too discovers a hornets’ nest of contradictions in the Balkan peoples’ perception of Europe and more particularly the EU. On the one hand, the long Ottoman experience has resulted in – or is at least often invoked as a justification of – the perception of the EU as a giant state-like organization which one is allowed to cheat on not only by misappropriating money, but also by fainting commitment to ‘European values’. While the commercial and financial benefits of the European Union are highly appreciated, many of its moral principles (as cultural pluralism, tolerance to ethnic and religious minorities, to homosexuals *et cetera*) are regarded by many as a threat to the own moral value system and ultimately to national identity. At the same time, the Balkan peoples continue to perceive themselves as backward and to think of products from the Balkans – be they material or spiritual – as valuable only if “Europe” values them. Europe’s not valuing them is yet another source of resentment. Especially Balkan values as sociability, hospitality, joviality and generosity are referred to as opposed to the individualism and materialism of Western society, which intruded Balkan society together with neo-liberal capitalism in the post-communist period. Dwelling on the issue of the (in)compatibility between West European and Balkan values, Roth mentions, as the basic values of the EU, Enlightenment, civil society, pluralism, free market economy, democracy, a high degree of confidence in the anonymous representatives of political and administrative institutions and a highly developed feeling of individual responsibility for the common well-being. He holds that, although they were adopted by the Balkan elites in the 19th century already, these values have never been interiorized by the majority of the population – even not in Greece which has been an EU member for almost thirty years. Facing the apparently unfeasible task of reshaping their nations according to European requirements and reluctant to become “Europeans” (while being eager to obtain the economic benefits of being a part of the EU), Balkan intellectuals flee into “an imaginary, heroic past of national greatness” which, as it finds little understanding in Western Europe, turns out to be an additional source of frustration.

Vasilios MAKRIDES too elaborates on the distinction between “classical” and “modern” Balkan anti-Occidentalism in his overview of Greek perceptions of the West. To his opinion, “classical” Greek anti-Occidentalism has its roots in the Great Schism of 1054 and the Crusaders’ Capture of Constantinople in 1204 and has been successfully continued by the Greek church. “Modern” anti-Occidentalism in Greece is hard to distinguish from anti-capitalism, anti-Americanism, anti-(neo)colonialism or anti-globalism. According to Makrides, Greece is a “special case” because of the particular place ancient Greece occupies in Western discourses on democracy. Although Western interpretations of Greek antiquity have served Western aims in the first place, these discourses rendered ancient Greece imperative in the construction of a Greek national identity. Not only ancient Greece, but also the Byzantine legacy and Western modernity had to be integrated, which made the whole process particularly complex and often contradictory. Makrides surveys Greek perceptions of the West throughout the ages and concludes with an assessment of modern Greek anti-Occidentalism. It appears that the attitudes of Greek nationalists towards the West result mainly from concrete post-war political experiences (as, for instance, the lack

of Western support for Greece's position on the Cypriote and the Macedonian questions), while anti-Western views of Greek leftist radicals are rooted in "global" anti-Occidentalism. Anyhow, Makrides thinks that modern Greek anti-Occidentalism is predominantly a question of rhetoric; Greek *Realpolitik* is pro-Western.

Roumen DASKALOV offers a short history of pro- and anti-Western discourses in Bulgaria. Having dealt briefly with anti-Western discourses prior to the 19th-century, when the "Latins" used to be attacked more fiercely by the Orthodox priests than the Muslims, Daskalov focuses on the perception of the West in the National Revival period, when the West was still regarded as a model which was admired the more so as the East – the Ottoman Empire – was abhorred. Bulgaria under Ottoman rule was assessed mainly from the point of view of Western achievements. However, the perception of the West or rather of the various Western countries also increasingly depended on whether they supported or not the Bulgarian national ambitions. This leaning became even stronger after the First World War. The contribution to the volume made by Katerina GEHL and Petăr PETROV indicates how Bulgarian political cartoons "commenting" on the 1919 Peace Treaty of Neuilly tend to represent Bulgaria as the harmless victim of merciless imperialist Western Great Powers. This representation, the authors hold, corresponded to the general perception the Bulgarian public had.

The opening of the borders to cheaper West European industrial products, Daskalov explains, provoked dissatisfaction. During the interwar period, both nationalist and socialist criticism of the West increased, echoing certain Russian Slavophile ideas, and intellectuals and artists took a keen interest in popular culture in their search for a national identity. More radically tuned intellectuals shared the fascist rejection of free market economy, bourgeois parliamentary democracy and Western cultural pluralism as imposed "from above" and foreign to the people. In the post-World War II period, Bulgarians did or did not believe communist propaganda; in the latter case, they often idealized the West. Modern, post-communist perceptions of the West are closely connected to the country's integration in the Euro-Atlantic institutions. Expectations focus on the standard of living, rather than on democracy and civil rights. Anti-Occidentalism is often fomented by disillusionment, not only with those who remained in ill-functioning post-totalitarian Bulgaria, but also with those who in vain tried their luck "in Europe".

Finally, Daskalov pays attention to those Bulgarian artists in the interwar period who attempted to express in their works a Bulgarian identity, resorting mainly to folklore. These artistic endeavours were supported by efforts to scientifically define a Bulgarian national character. National psychology (*narodna psihologija*) developed into a kind of "science", claiming the existence of a genuinely "Bulgarian" philosophy, metaphysics and politics. Daskalov concludes, like most other contributors to the volume, that modern anti-Occidentalism in the Balkans is very much an intellectual construction whose impact on daily life and public opinion is hard to fathom. The obsession with national identity is not always an expression of anti-Occidentalism.

Emilia STAITSHEVA analyses two Bulgarian plays dealing with Europe: Dobri Vojnikov's inevitable *Krivorazbranata civilizacija* (Civilization Wrongly Understood, 1871) and Hristo Bojčev's *Polkovnikăt Ptica* (Colonel Bird, 1996). The former

play is emblematic for Bulgarians defending their own patriarchal values against Western modernity during the National Revival period. The grotesque *Polkovnikät Ptica* is representative of the post-totalitarian period in Bulgarian history, when attitudes towards the West were determined by the process of Euro-Atlantic integration. It reveals a number of anti-Western reservations in relation to the 1995 military intervention of the NATO in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also – which is more interesting – a typically post-modern scepticism concerning the “great narrative” about national identity.

In Serbia, anti-Occidental feelings probably have been more important than in Bulgaria, as the threat from the West and in particular the Habsburg Empire was more tangible. Like Makrides, Bojan ALEKSOV emphasizes the role of the Orthodox clergy in upholding anti-Western ideas, regarding anti-Catholicism as the precursor of anti-Westernism. According to Aleksov, anti-Catholic feelings were enhanced when Serbs, fleeing for the Ottomans, settled in Venetian or Habsburg lands, where they were enserfed and put under religious pressure by their Catholic overlords. Enlightenment and secularism were perceived by many Serbs as a similar threat to their fundamentally Orthodox Christian ethno-cultural identity. The perception of history as a permanent Western conspiracy was fuelled by the Russian Slavophiles’ view of Catholic – and, for that matter, Protestant – Western Europe as hostile, soulless and corrupt. It was the Serbs’ mission to resist Western assaults on Orthodox Christianity. The Kosovo myth represents the quintessence of Serbia’s martyrdom for the sake of the Orthodox faith. According to Aleksov, the legacy of the past is “ingrained not only in the writings of nationalist ideologists, but also in the consciousness and collective psychology of the people”.

While stressing its anti-Catholic prehistory, Aleksov too is inclined to regard modern Serbian anti-Occidentalism as a local variant of anti-Western discourses in the West itself. Not accidentally, anti-Occidental discourses gained popularity in Serbia among the intelligentsia especially in the interwar period, after they had become influential in Western European countries like Italy and Germany. In their contributions, Klaus BUCHENAU and Ksenija PETROVIĆ go deeper into “Orthodox” anti-Westernism, focusing on the influence Serbian anti-Occidentalism underwent from Russian Slavophile thinkers and more particularly Dostojevski, especially in some of the monasteries organized after the model of *Optyna pustyn’*. In the interwar period, Slavophile thinking in Serbia, boosted by Russian immigrants, was “enriched” with anti-Semitism. The revival of Orthodoxy in Serbia in the 1980s as well was partly due to the influence of Russian religious thinkers, who in the 1980s resumed spreading 19th-century Slavophile perceptions of the West.

An interesting case is Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović, who in the 1920s “discovered” the *zadruga* as a Slavic Orthodox institution (after the model of the Russian *mir*) and embraced messianism: Orthodox Serbia would redeem secularized Europe from the diseases Russian Slavophiles had diagnosed earlier. Velimirović too sympathized with Nazism. According to Velimirović, European values as humanism, individualism, liberalism and pluralism had caused a chaos which would destroy the unity of the Serbian nation and the Serbian church. His pupil Justin Popović, professor of theology before the war and quite influential as a monk after, considered Catholicism responsible for atheism, socialism, anarchism and the entire Western culture’s drift-

ing away from the pure (Orthodox) faith. Popović used to criticize the Yugoslav political leaders for their neglect of the “spiritual, cultural and historical identity of the Serbian people”. The Serbian Patriarchate canonized Velimirović in 2003, thus displaying its approval of his anti-Occidental ideas. His followers are not opposed to Serbia’s joining the EU, though. They rather consider Serbia’s accession as an opportunity to re-Christianize the EU.

Petrović, who focuses on Serbian attitudes toward Europe in connection with the conflict in Kosovo, observes a certain development in the higher clergy’s attitudes. The Serbian Patriarchate has always set itself up as the protector of the Serbian nation against its many enemies – not only Catholicism, but also Enlightenment and of course Islam. Serbia’s incessant struggle for survival – the apogee of which was the battle of Kosovo – is imagined as a martyr’s suffering for his faith. Understandably, the Serbian church took an uncompromising stance on Kosovo’s belonging to Serbia. However, as Petrović indicates, there have always been more moderate voices as well among the lower clergy and the laity. And, remarkably, the higher clergy too displayed much more moderation and pragmatism during the Kosovo conflict than during the conflict in Bosnia. The Serbian church is prepared to collaborate with the representatives of the international community and tries to mediate between Serbs and Kosovars, which is, to be sure, only another interpretation of its task as protector of the nation. As possible reasons for this transformation, Petrović points at the changing political situation. The nationalist leaders who supported the Patriarchate have disappeared. The opposition to the higher clergy’s radicalism was likely to cause a rift within the church. And finally, new problems like the separatism of the Macedonian and the Montenegrin churches have aroused.

Nenad STEFANOV discusses Serbian anti-Occidentalism in the light of the tension between Western liberal values and the defence of national identity. Referring to the writings of Dobrica Ćosić and other former “dissidents”, he shows how certain Western liberal principle like liberty, democracy and human rights were adopted by Serbian intellectuals (e. g. of the *Praxis* group) and eventually got “ethnicized”. In a rather mystical way, these European values were identified as components of Serbian national identity and Serbia itself was regarded as a bulwark defending them against their enemies – (united) Germany, the Vatican, militant Islam and the United States. At the same time, these principles were increasingly interpreted as the exclusive rights of the Serbian nation which were violated in the framework of federal Yugoslavia – an attitude that paradoxically paved the way for a rehabilitation of interwar authoritarianism and rightist extremism. Stefanov concludes that current Serbian anti-Occidentalism is to be understood in the light of Serbian experiences in the former Yugoslavia.

Miro MAŠEK’s analysis of “borders and identities” in the literary work of Miloš Crnjanski constitutes an interesting illustration of “Serbian anti-Occidentalism” as described by other contributors. Crnjanski’s search for an authentic identity induced him to evoke the paradise-like mythic and mystic primitivism of a tribal society which he situates in an imagined Sumatra. Crnjanski’s pan-Slavism is very much of the same mystical nature. Initially, his anti-Occidentalism is inspired by his concern for the preservation of a Serbian or South Slav ethno-cultural identity; later on, it was influenced by Western critics of democracy, capitalism and Enlightenment. Espe-

cially the “French spirit” is considered as a danger to Serbian national identity and to European civilisation in general. Although Crnjanski’s ideas are quite idiosyncratic and not always very consistent, they were frequently referred to in the context of the Serbian anti-Occidental and nationalist discourses in the late 1980s and the 1990s.

Romania’s anti-Occidentalism is a peculiar case, as Romania only partly – or not at all in the opinion of most Romanians – belongs to the Balkans. As Romanian is a “Western”, Romance language, the Romanians like to perceive themselves as Westerners surrounded by “Oriental” Slavs. However, according to Wolfgang DAHMEN, the contemporary Romanians’ consciousness of their “*romanitate*” has not come down from the time of the Romans, as they like to believe; it dates from the 17th century. Moreover, their faith makes them a part of the “Oriental” Orthodox Christian world. The Romanians’ belonging to the “Ottoman East” was particularly obvious in the period of the Phanariote domination of Wallachia and Moldavia, when the Romanian elite, in spite of its fascination with Western Enlightenment, was thoroughly Hellenized and Orientalized. Cultural orientation to the West was mainly a 19th-century phenomenon. It was followed, in the beginning of the 20th century, by the search for the “*fenomen românesc*”, which was discovered in the patriarchal life of the Romanian peasants. Nicolae Iorga looked for Romania’s identity in her belonging to the Balkan, Phanariote and Ottoman worlds, stressing Romania’s particular place in European culture, though. The patriarchal, agrarian and “pure” nature of the Romanian people was highlighted by other Romanian intellectuals as well. They opposed the “Romanian soul” to the corrupting influence of the West, very much in the same way as the Russian Slavophiles had done. Orthodoxy played a crucial part here. Universalistic French culture lost its attraction; German Herderian thinking gained popularity. Many Romanian intellectuals considered Westernization a necessary evil.

Anton STERBLING’s contribution offers a closer view on the opinions of some prominent Romanian intellectuals of the interwar and the post-war period. He stresses the close ties between the vicissitudes of modernization and the justifying pro- or anti-Western discourses accompanying them. Concerns about material well-being and conflicting economic interests happen to be concealed behind discourses on national identity and the threat of “the West”. Anti-Occidentalism was very strong in the interwar period, when Mussolini’s Italy inspired many, but it reached its peak in the Ceaușescu period, when traditional anti-Occidentalism was fuelled by the communist rejection of the Western economic and political system and the cult of Romanian identity acquired grotesque dimensions. Sterbling shortly deals with a number of representative Romanian interwar intellectuals. While Eugen Lovinescu values Romanian backwardness because it facilitated the Westernization of the country, others like Emil Cioran, Mircea Eliade and Lucian Blaga blame the West for its lack of knowledge about Romania, and the Romanians for neglecting their own culture. Romania is regarded in a rather mystical way as an extraordinary country with a tremendous primitive cultural vitality and potential. According to Sterbling, these rather far-fetched Romanian discourses resulted mainly from the failure of Romanian modernization projects.

The volume includes also two contributions dealing with Turkey. As the Balkans cannot be studied without the Ottoman context, Turkey has a legitimate place in the

Balkan context. That Turkey is not generally accepted as a part of Europe transpires from the fact that both contributions actually pay no less attention to Western discourses about Turkey than to Turkish discourses about the West. In his survey of the complex Ottoman attitudes towards the West, Fikret ADANIR holds that they were determined by historical developments, more specifically the steady loss of territories in the Balkans due to Western (including Russian) military and diplomatic interventions and the increasing economic dependence of the Empire on the Western powers. The process of Westernisation, which started in the 18th century and reached its apogee during the *Tanzimat* period in the 19th century, radically changed the nature of the Ottoman Empire and provoked strong anti-Western feelings among its Muslims inhabitants who believed they had to cede their dominant position to the Christians. Although the *Tanzimat* was continued, the secession of the newly formed Christian nations urged the Ottomans to replace straightforward Westernization by ideologies – as they hoped – mobilizing more effectively, like pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism. Adanır shows that the Kemalist regime as well, in spite of its hard-handed Westernization program, was essentially anti-Western, due to its anti-colonialist stances. Westernization was resorted to in order to withstand the West. Initially, it was also much less hostile to Islam as generally assumed. Islam was regarded as an essential component of Turkish national identity. Only in the 1930s, an increasing emphasis was placed on language and (Turkic) descent.

Adanır and Günter SEUFERT, in his article, make clear that currently Turkish attitudes towards the West are caught within a triangle formed by Kemalism, Islamism and pro-Western commitment, in a large variety of combinations and degrees of radicalism. In practice, however, Europe and more specifically the EU are approached with moderation and pragmatism. Both authors advocate a similar attitude towards Turkey on the part of the EU. Some developments should be carefully considered by EU decision makers and brought to the attention of European public opinion, for instance, the fact that the growing prominence of Islam in the public sphere may be an indication of increasing “de-Kemalization” and democratization, rather than of a growing influence of political Islam. Most Turkish Muslims expect that EU membership will offer more cultural and religious freedom in the framework of a democratic and pluralistic state.

At the end of the volume, Jordanka TELBIZOVA-SACK deals with the perception of Europe by the Balkan Muslims. The Albanians, who are rather stepmotherly treated in the volume, are briefly mentioned here in connection to Ibrahim Rugova’s decision to embrace Catholicism. (He considered Islam as an obstacle to modernization and Westernization.) Telbizova-Sack focuses on the Bosnian Muslims. She holds that the Balkan Muslims perceive Europe as a historical and cultural space in which they are perfectly entitled to a place of their own. Like the Turkish Muslims, they consider the EU as an institution which is likely to protect them, not against an authoritarian secular state as is the case in Turkey, but against their aggressive Christian neighbours. They are prepared to adopt the Western democratic model, while keeping their reservations against some Western values or rather against (as they see it) a lack of values (e.g. tolerance against homosexuality). The author’s historical survey of the fate of the Muslim minorities in the post-Ottoman Christian nation-states makes clear that their conservatism was of a defensive nature and that there have always



been a (limited) number of progressive intellectuals among them. Openness to modernity, however, went hand in hand with the concern to preserve a Muslim identity. At the eve of and during World War II, Bosnian Islam, facing fascism and communism, tended to radicalize, and some of these radical ideas were recycled in a more moderate form by some Bosnian Muslim thinkers in the 1970s and 1980s (among whom Alija Izetbegović). Telbizova-Sack thinks that nowadays, in spite of the support Saudi-Arabia and other Muslim countries offer them, most Bosniaks still favour the Western model of a secularized and pluralistic society.

*Prowestliche und antiwestliche Diskurse in den Balkanländern/Südosteuropa* is a particularly interesting collection of articles on a topic which has also attracted the attention of decision makers within the EU. They assume that the perception of Europe and European values by the citizens of candidate member-states may have an impact on the accession process. From a more academic point of view, the articles collected in the volume offer an excellent starting point for further research on the interaction between Balkan anti-Occidentalism and Balkan Orientalism. The Balkans has been the object of Orientalist studies, but it has also developed its own particular Orientalist discourse, which is rarely investigated as such. Living in an “intermediate”, “transitional” zone, Balkan peoples seem to have no “pure” anti-Western or anti-Eastern attitudes; they both appear in some hybrid form. People in the Balkans apparently feel the need to dissociate themselves not only from the (Ottoman) Orient, but also from the West, while at the same time being attracted to the West as a model and to the East as a familiar and reassuring social environment. Neither attitude can be adequately investigated without taking into account the other. Vojnikov’s *Krivorazbranata civilizacija* cannot be understood exclusively as a rejection of the West. Vojnikov was a committed pro-Westerner. Significantly, not only the Westernized Margaridi is ridiculed, but also Marijka’s father Kosta, the embodiment of the patriarchal values, who uses (already at the time of Vojnikov) obsolete Turkish words and behaves “like a Turk”. Westernization in the framework of *Tanzimat* was disliked not only by “classic” anti-Occidentalists, to be found mainly among the Orthodox clergy, but also by fierce opponents of “Ottoman backwardness” – nationalists and radical socialists – who adhered to “modern” anti-Occidentalist ideas. Paradoxically, the most committed proponents of Westernization among the Balkan Christian population were the (many) so-called Turcophiles, who supported the Ottoman reform project. Thus, seen in the light of Balkan attitudes towards “the East”, Balkan pro- and anti-Western discourses seem to be an even more complex issue than this rich and stimulating volume suggests.

Ghent

RAYMOND DETREZ

SABINA FERHADBEGOVIĆ: *Prekäre Integration. Serbisches Staatsmodell und regionale Selbstverwaltung in Sarajevo und Zagreb 1918–1929* (= Südosteuropäische Arbeiten, Bd. 134). R. Oldenbourg Verlag: München 2008. 352 S. ISBN 978-3-486-58479-0.

Die vordringlichsten Aufgaben des nach dem 1. Weltkrieg entstandenen „Staates der Serben, Kroaten und Slowenen“ (SHS) waren der Aufbau einer landesweit funktio-